Introduction
Ordered Christology: Three Approaches
The main thesis of the present paper is to argue the importance for the centrality of the ontological a priori to theological construction, with special regard to Christology. Christology is thus the destination of the paper, but the journey is one that will happen through both methodology and ontology, paying close attention to how significant theological a priori are constructed, and leading in to Christology as a fundamentally distributed doctrine. In reality, this paper is one that takes a step back from first order Christological construction and begins with the question of second order methodological and dogmatic antecedents: when and where do we consider Christology within the realm of revealed theology, and how do we get there? In simpler terms, where is the theological “position” of Christology? The question is nothing new, and considerations of Christology as dominated by philosophical and theological assumptions can be seen as primary modes even in the early Nicaean and Chalcedonian debates. Here Donald Fairbairn has done great legwork in his Grace and Christology in the Early Church, mapping out what is essentially a Christology “from above” in the Nicene tradition, versus one “from below” in the Arian and Nestorian traditions, the latter of which neglected the important preconsiderations of sin and grace to the incarnate mission of the Son.1 According to Fairbairn, the centrality of the assumption of a three-act scheme of salvation—creation, fall, and redemption—led necessarily to the delineation of orthodox Christology, as opposed to a two-act scheme, which held to creation and glorification.2 This, again, could fit nicely with the more recent language inaugurated by Wolfhart Pannenberg of a “Christology from above” versus a “Christology from below”: was Christ’s mission anthrocentric, to exult and deify human nature, or was it theocentric, to redeem humanity to a glorified personal relationship with its creator?3
Underlying the conversation is the assumption of certain theological dualisms and the need to resolve them. A few of the unaddressed questions in early debates that may have led to speaking past one another may have included: what sin is; whether it is equivalent to or distinguished from mere finitude; and the relationship between the goodness of God and creation. Overcoming the presupposed disparity between God and the world, between Creator and creation, was of particular import to the lifelong theological project of John Bainbridge Webster (1955–2016), who was devoted to better articulating a “theological theology.”4 In his 2015 article, “Christology, Theology, Economy,” Webster acknowledges the difficulty of dualisms in approaching theological integration of the person and work of Christ. He noted that it “straddles the two subject-domains of systematic theology,” i.e. theology proper and economy, stating that “Christology is a distributed doctrine.” Webster gives a four-point Christological sketch: 1. “Christology is a division of the doctrine of the Trinity”; 2. “as a division of the doctrine of the Trinity, Christology is concerned with both theology and economy theology first, economy by derivation”; 3. it is a distributed doctrine, “not restricted to particular locus of a system of Christian teaching”; and 4. “Christology is not in and of itself the starting point or centre of Christian teaching, but one indispensable element of a complex whole.”5 For Webster, then, consideration of God in se must hold a priority in any Christological formulation, and further, the causal priority of Christ’s deity and his freedom as Logos must be observed. Webster provides what could be considered a touchstone for how to approach Christology, carefully ordering Christological considerations within the dogmatic account of the Triune God’s nature and economy. As such, it is unsurprising that Webster’s account largely resonates with the tradition stemming from Cyril and reaching through Aquinas. His method also finds company with the latest volume from Stephen Duby, Jesus and the God of Classical Theism, which advocates similarly that the dual natures of the one person of Christ must be considered both compatible and ordered causally toward deity first. In Duby’s account, it is not improper to call Christ’s flesh an “instrument” (organon) if one considers the relation of the incarnation to the Son’s mission to reveal the Father on the one hand, and the compatibility of created realities to the facility of the Creator on the other.6
A response to this would be the recent Christological formulation of Bruce McCormack, in his 2021 work The Humility of the Eternal Son. There, McCormack intentionally fronts Christology as the first of a three-volume project, his goal being to, in his own words, “repair Chalcedon.” According to McCormack, there is an “aporia at the heart of the Definition,” which he states this way: “Jesus of Nazareth contributes nothing to the constitution of the ‘person.’ He has no constitutive role to play in the composition of the ‘person’ in which two natures are said to ‘subsist’ … he stands in no real relation to the Logos.”7 McCormack would undoubtedly disagree with Webster and Duby concerning the causal inferiority of the flesh of Christ in theological estimation—indeed, this seems to be a primary point of contention, i.e. that mere economic suffering or experience is no experience at all.8 Thus, in critiquing the writings of Cyril, McCormack is quick to show “the fundamental asymmetry” of the church father’s account of Jesus’s experiences, which he does not believe to be theologically satisfying: Christ’s humanity is merely instrumentalized under the ownership of the single subject, where it would seem the Word alone is the active nature, leaving the door open to Nestorianism.9 For McCormack, this is due to certain considerations on the level of theology proper that make the mutuality between the two natures of Christ fundamentally incompatible. McCormack self-avowedly desires to strike certain attributes like simplicity and impassibility from the record. Instead, and with a heuristic aim to fix Chalcedon, McCormack endorses what he styles “a Reformed version of kenotic Christology,” capitalizing on the hotly-debated kenosis concept and, subsequently, advocating what he calls “ontological receptivity.” Based on predetermination and the eternal generation of the Son, there was never a Logos asarkos, a “Word without flesh”: there was always the ontological receptivity of the Logos to become flesh. To this McCormack adds the concept of “absorption,” where the experience of the biological death of Jesus is “absorbed’ into the divine life eternal.
McCormack does not wish to jettison Chalcedon entirely, striving to retain significant theologia like hypostasis, substance, and nature, although his final chapter, where he proffers what he calls a “repair” of Chalcedon, reads as a salvage. He attempts to avoid Schleiermacher’s reduction and rejection of Chalcedonian categories, while simultaneously ignoring the components underlying those categories, e.g. nature of Creator and creation. Schleiermacher’s Christology is a muffled voice beneath the fabric of McCormack’s argument: McCormack, who could be considered both a Barthian and Neo-Kantian, does not wish to endorse a view of Christ’s nature that is dogmatically reductive on the level of Schleiermacher, and certainly does not wish to present Christ as mere perfected God-consciousness.
Yet Schleiermacher’s Christology should not be approached in a reductive fashion either, and this study must gravitate to him. For Schleiermacher, Christ as Redeemer is the foundation and centerpoint of the Christian faith. On the level of his structural dogmatic, then, he considers the centrality of Christ to the founding of the Christian faith within his earliest discussions on redemption in section 11. For Schleiermacher, the Christian community is one that becomes conscious of its origin in the redemption provided by its founder, Jesus of Nazareth. Thus “redemption is effected by Christ and comes to consciousness within the Christian communion,” this redemption being “the central point of religion.” Importantly, what Schleiermacher means by redemption is not a forensic reality, but rather, “kindling the God-consciousness” of humanity, the need for this being apparent in humanity’s falling away from a perfected God-consciousness, what he calls “God-forgetfulness.”10 This is consistent with Schleiermacher’s later consideration of sin, which he views as a disparity between God-consciousness and our active dependence on God.11 When he finally arrives at the person of Christ in section 93, the focus is thus on Christ’s impeccability as ground for his work as Redeemer: Christ demonstrates the perfect God-consciousness, and in this sense he is both the same as every human, yet different. This is all a bit dense, and if we are to take a page from Karl Barth, we can look at Schleiermacher’s sermons for elucidation here: in an 1810 sermon, “Concerning the Union of What is Human and What is Divine in the Redeemer,” Schleiermacher considers the growth in Christ’s consciousness of the divine, and casts his divinity in terms of the continual awareness of God that Christ exemplifies for those of faith, the paradigm of what it means to be perfectly human. Christ is the image of the divine and the savior of the world in the sense that he exemplifies this perfect model of spiritual growth in dependence on God, without the sin of interrupted God-consciousness.12 Considering this recasting of theological concepts in the person and work of Christ, it is unsurprising to return to his work The Christian Faith and find him segueing immediately into a discussion of keygmatic formulations of Christological concepts, choosing to jettison the classical theologia of nature and person as self-contradictory and abstruse.13 Although Schleiermacher does not want to part entirely from Chalcedonian concepts—he seems to be attempting to retrieve a degree of Chalcedonianism in s. 97, for example—he aggressively outlines seven attacks on Chalcedonian Christology in s. 96, and his positive articulation of the person of Christ is nonetheless one in which union of the divine and human natures is only such in the unique perfection of Christ’s humanity.14 As such, Schleiermacher’s Christ is one that Troy Stefano terms “a humanist par excellence.”15
This discussion of three key approaches—two contemporary ones in Webster and McCormack, and one historical in Friedrich Schleiermacher, with all three representing divergent positions along a spectrum—leads us to the doorstep of Isaak Dorner. In fact, these three theologians are not themselves incidental to Dorner: John Webster often praises Dorner’s dogmatic in his own writings, referring to him as “without equal” in mediating theology, and Bruce McCormack analyzes him in the context of 19th century kenoticism, referring to him as “the finest German theologian in the period between Schleiermacher and Hegel on the one hand and Karl Barth on the other.”16 Indeed, Schleiermacher was an important influence on Dorner’s project at large: Dorner similarly started with faith and moved out to construct a theological vision of the world. At the same time, Dorner’s dogmatic differs profoundly from Schleiermacher: as a mediating theologian, he sought to recover orthodoxy with one hand while reaching out to philosophical trends with the other. In fact, it is Dorner’s conviction that Schleiermacher himself is inconsistent in his own application of his method, and that he should have come to different conclusions, conclusions Dorner himself reaches. This will be the subject of the next section of this paper, considering Dorner’s dogmatic and certain indications on the level of theology proper, ontology, and the doctrine of revelation that feed into language concerning the deity of the Son from the perspective of perfected humanhood. It will further be considered how Dorner’s own consideration of the centrality of the ontological a priori could provide a theological “anchor” for theologies that tend to construct their Christology “from below,” a sort of theologically-sneaky move of slipping Christ’s deity in through the back door of his humanity. In other words, perhaps Dorner’s indications could provide a sort of corrective for liberal theologians like Schleiermacher and others, helping to avoid styling Jesus as “a humanist par excellence” and thus avoiding Ebionism and more closely approximating the Chalcedonian concept.17
Dorner in Three Acts
Dorner’s dogmatic demonstrates a remarkable and sometimes surprising homogeneity. One of the so-called mediating theologians, Dorner’s project attempted to build on Schleiermacher’s foundations while still arriving at orthodox and confessional conclusions for the church. A fusion of Hegel and Schleiermacher, Dorner sought to approach a constructive theology from the subjective element, beginning with faith or what he termed “pisteology,” yet working out his conclusions toward the received dogma of the church. At the risk of sounding reductive, this latter element sets him apart from Schleiermacher and provides the concept of a mediating (or sometimes phrased, “conciliatory”) theology.18 In this sense, Dorner’s theology is a fascinating exercise in dogmatic method: holding to most of the same loci as what could be considered a classical theology, he builds off Schleiermacher’s method, yet arrives at many seemingly orthodox and confessional conclusions. In particular, his Christocentricity is paramount to understanding his dogmatic motives, where Dorner seeks to drive toward the centrality of the divine-human personality of Christ. Although he seems to be overshadowed by the innovations of Albrecht Ritschl, his successor as professor of theology at the University of Göttingen, Dorner himself was broadly influential, his thought impacting the Princeton school, along with figures like Herman Bavinck, Karl Barth, and John Webster.19 Nonetheless, the only English translation of his four-volume work, A System of Christian Doctrine, is the 1897 edition by Edinburgh T&T Clark used here, and perhaps there is room for a fresh translation of his work.
The first element within Dorner’s ordered thought is the centrality he places on ontological considerations of the nature and essence of God. Self-avowedly speculative, Dorner desires to construct, from the correlates of faith, a picture of God that is holistic and germane to assumed categories of deity. In his section on arguments for God’s existence, Dorner reasons that “The Absolute so coincides with the roots of rational thought, with its possibility, that without it that which is one’s own mentality … must cease.”20 In essence, such ontological reasoning is not a mere argument, but a central element of accurately conceiving the nature and being of God; without it, other arguments and even dogmatic ordering of posterior theological concepts collapse.
The reception of an ontological argument for God’s existence notably declined into the 19th century, particularly in the era post-Kant.21 In its classical, Anselmian form, the ontological argument for God’s existence stated that, since God is a being above which no greater can be conceived, it violates this definition for the subject to not then extend this existence into the subject’s own conception of reality. In essence, so essential is the concept of God’s existence that it cannot be logically denied.22 Other forms of this argument began to arise into the Enlightenment period, as it appealed to certain rationalist sensibilities. For example, Rene Descartes’s form of the argument appealed strongly to a conception of God present in the mind that was irreducible, a being whose existence was so immense as to not be possible of synthetic fabrication from experience: in other words, God must be conceived to exist because the idea of his nature is so above the limits of human reasoning that it must have been implanted by God himself, prior even to the conception of the self.23 German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz felt Descartes’s formulation should have included the concept of necessity as a central facet of this reasoning, devising the following formula: A) a necessary being exists; B) God, by definition, is such a being; therefore, C) God exists.24 After Leibnitz, Christian Wolff attempted to devise an ontological argument from cogency of thought, advocating a philosophical ontology called ontological possiblism: if something can reasonably said to exist, it must exist in reality, the same being true of God. To risk putting it into a somewhat trite axiom: possibility implies existence. Things are known to exist in reality, and thus God, conceived to exist in the highest form of existence, must exist.25
Immanuel Kant implemented Wolff’s argument, and after Kant the popular evaluation of the ontological argument takes a significant turn. Indeed, even today, the merits of the ontological argument are often ridiculed as insufficient, logical nonsense, or even idolatrous, as though God himself were generated by the mind. In fact, in a nutshell, Kant’s own consideration of the ontological argument is more an argument against Wolff’s form of the argument: simply put, existence is not a predicate. One either exists or does not exist, and this is not an attribute or quality, merely a binary reality.26 Schleiermacher’s theology, then, attempts to construct God’s existence from the feeling of dependence. Similar to Kant, who reasoned that God’s existence is a logical inference from moral freedom as purposive, Schleiermacher holds that God’s existence is the immediate referent of our sense of dependence, God being conceived in this fashion as “that which is wholly other.” The ontological argument, in the classical Anselmian or rationalist sense, falls out of favor in 19th century dogmatics, which tended to favor either empirical deduction or a subjective formulation from moral and ethical nature as per Kant or feeling of dependence as per Schleiermacher.
Perhaps this is due to the shift from dogmatics to apologetics that happens in theological emphases of the 19th century, a reality lamented by, for example, Dutch theologian Herman Bavinck.27 Indeed, conceiving the ontological a priori as, in fact, an argument may be missing the boat entirely. Lydia Schumacher, in her 2011 article, “The Lost Legacy of Anselm’s Ontological Argument,” has pointed out that Anselm’s assumption and basis for reasoning is within a noetic reality that exists after the divine dissipation of the smoke of sin, in chapter one of the Proslogion. As such, Anselm’s reasoning is one that exists within and from the presence of faith: it believes that there is such a thing as the divine, and—importantly—such a thing as the noetic effects of sin, which places Anselm firmly outside the realm of a natural or rationalist theology. For Anselm, the ontological cogency of God’s nature and being, so indispensable to faith, is less of an argument and more of a theological exercise in redeemed intellect, homogenous with his famous dictum of “fides quaerens intellectum” (faith seeking understanding).
No less is true of Dorner, who places such ontological reasoning in a centrifugal position in his dogmatic. Dorner cites Hegel’s idea that a posteriori proofs for God’s existence will always fail without the necessary a priori groundwork in rightly conceiving the divine essence and nature, writing, “…all other arguments … [are] untrue forms of the Ontological…”28 In his direct exposition of the ontological argument, which he calls instead “the Ontological moment,” Dorner holds that the unity of the divine idea must either be central to human thought, or abandoned.29 Yet abandoning the divine essence is not an option: “It is not open, therefore, we say, to the rational thinker to avow an Absolute or not—he must avow it. The Absolute so coincides with the roots of rational thought, with its possibility, that without it that which is one’s own mentality … must cease.” This “Ontological moment,” for Dorner, is thus much more than an argument: it is structurally foundational to all human and rational thought, hanging on the conception of the united essence of God as Absolute. In an interesting turn, he invokes Kant, noting that “Without this principle of unity, all falls to pieces,” and going on to state that, “We regard this necessity of the thought of absolute Being as the ultimate unity in relation to thought and existence, to the world of volition and to knowledge.”30 Such thoughts are the direct foundation of the construction of deity, and are in some sense originally divine, as without them we could not conceive God: “We think God through God; with our actual thought of Him He proves Himself as actually existing.”31 This primal conception of the irreducible unity of God’s being provides a foundation both dogmatic and epistemic for Dorner to then branch into what he calls “consequences”: considering forms of error, Dorner believes that “Dualism (and its softened form of Deism) is directly excluded by the Absolute … But, on the other hand, acosmistic Pantheism does not follow from the fact that God originally embraces all things in Himself…”32 In other words, both errors—Dualism and Deism on the one hand, and Pantheism on the other—are avoided by a proper a priori conception that the absoluteness and unity of God’s being is central to human thought and reason. From this ontological a priori, Dorner even constructs divine simplicity, infinity, omnipresence, and eternity.33 Later, in his work on theology proper in volume two, Dorner will consider God as “all-sufficient in Himself,” and thus in need of no extrinsic object. In consistency with classical articulations of theological ordering, Dorner emphasizes the fact that God must first be conceived of in himself, and secondarily toward us, even in an ethical sense: although God is pure love, this love must not be seen as necessitating the existence of a secondary object, i.e. the world, but must be seen defined first in relation to God.34 Importantly, and as a final note to this first component, all of these considerations are articulations of what Dorner has earlier called “the Fundamental Doctrine” in three divisions: 1. “Doctrine of God”; 2. “The Doctrine of the Creature, especially Man”; and 3. “The doctrine of the communion or union of God and man by means of the divine self-revelation…”35
A second component of Dorner’s road to a divine Christology is his doctrine of revelation and divine self-disclosure, the third division of Dorner’s fundamental doctrine. In this, Dorner represents the shift toward revelation as bearing a certain epistemic weight in theological construction.36 Nonetheless, Dorner’s conception of revelation is one that finds itself firmly rooted in the divine ontology and the concept of divine communicability, i.e. the concept that God’s ability to reveal himself is rooted in his very nature: the world is both separate from and freely created by God, yet designed “for complete participation in His eternal life and Spirit.”37 As creatures, we are made divinely receptive to God’s love, yet not necessitating it. In a somewhat memorable phrase, Dorner refers to humanity as “New homes of love,” where God’s ethical character as love was already full and fecund in himself. Humanity, as such, was destined for a self-communication of God’s love through capability and design, but not through necessity, and this Dorner feels is adequate for articulating without collapsing the Creator-creation communion-in-distinction. Revelation is thus posterior to divine self-communication, itself rooted in that certain ontological a priori related to the divine nature, and this comes to the forefront in his construal of revelation as original, continual, positive, and gradual. Once again, Dorner wishes to emphasize the fact that nature has been designed with what he calls “unlimited receptiveness,” “an incalculable degree of elasticity” for conference with the divine, and this is the grounds for revelation and divine self-communication, as well as, more specifically, miracles.38
Of utmost importance for the purposes of this study is Dorner’s conception of the content of revelation: hedging away from mere intellectual or noetic approaches, Dorner insists that the proper content of revelation is God himself, and its end is communion and fellowship with the creator. Here more ontological reasoning comes to the forefront: “Its content is God as regards the different elements of His idea; therefore God as regards His omnipotence, God as the principle of measure, order, beauty, holiness and right, of wisdom and love.”39 Here his work as a careful dogmatician is apparent, in that he rightly discerns the intellectual apprehension of this content to be not so much revelation externally-considered, but illumination.
Here the road leads to Dorner’s Christology, the third and final act of this paper. Much has been said about Dorner’s conception of a progressive Christology, i.e. one where the incarnation of Christ’s divinity is a progressive event, not accomplished in full at the conception, and great attention is often given to his large opus, History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ.40 Here, however, the discussion of the divine incarnation, or what Dorner calls “Godmanhood,” within his broader dogmatic in the System of Christian Doctrine, is particularly theologically valuable. Indeed, it is here that Dorner considers the ontological predicates necessary of God in his divine self-disclosure as coming to fulfillment: if God is who he is conceived of in himself, “all-sufficient,” and if divine self-disclosure is that free act of his own communicability, then this is manifest more fully in the great act of incarnation. “neither the form nor the content of Revelation … attains its perfection and the goal which revelation cannot but propose in itself, until it has passed into Incarnation.”41 In other words, self-disclosure is not full self-disclosure unless it is actual, personal divine presentation in creation, which incarnation accomplishes. Here Dorner follows a sort of train of thought that one could call “from below.” First of all, natural revelation—what we would call general revelation—is inferior to special revelation: “For whereas Nature is impersonal, an inspired man is a far more adequate organ of revelation, both as regards receptiveness for it, and the work of guarding and cultivating it.” Yet this, too, is inadequate for the fulfillment of divine self-disclosure: “The most perfect organ of revelation can only be the man who, from the first moment of his existence, in his entire person lives in a sphere of being pertaining to revelation and never separated from God.” Dorner finds this reality—of a perfect human form for divine revelation and the subject of the divine presence, that an adequate vessel for divine self-disclosure, and it is here that the study comes to a head:
It assumes a shape that embodies and manifests the divine life in human form, and is therefore divine-human. In the God-man the inner spiritual miracle is so united with the outer world-reality, that the union of the divine and human like, implied in the idea of inspiration without measure, forms a man who in the midst of the world is a personal miracle—the God-man who, possessed of absolute worth in himself, fully answers to the communicated will of divine love, and is withal destined both in himself to give perfect expression to human nature, and outside himself to consummate human nature.42
Dorner then goes on to describe this reality in which God himself desires to live and dwell with us, where logos is the very “principle of revelation.”43
There is quite a lot to unpack here, which must be taken along two coterminous lines of thought. First, Dorner’s primary assumptions are rooted in theology proper: given what can logically be assumed of God on the ontological level, the concept of revelation could only be perfected if it were God himself. Dorner’s secondary line of thought is along the lines of perfected humanhood: the most adequate form of revelation must be personal, and thus must be constituted by a human who lives in the sphere of revelation in complete and unbroken communion with God. It is here that we hear the voice of Schleiermacher: Jesus Christ is, for Schleiermacher, the perfected God-consciousness, who lived his life with no break in the dependence of his being upon God. Yet Dorner desires to bring these two strands together: such a human, a personal being, would have to necessarily be also divine. To put it another way: only a personal manifestation of God as a human could account for pure human communion with God.
In his own way, then, Dorner approximates language that allows for the communion of the two natures of Christ in one person, holding on to Chalcedonian categories while still conceding a methodological element to Schleiermacher. In essence, Dorner is saying that Schleiermacher’s humanist conception of Christ as the demonstration of the perfect God consciousness isn’t wrong for what it says, but for what it doesn’t say. Elsewhere, in his work on divine immutability, he comments on Schleiermacher’s On the Glaubenslehre, similarly critiquing Schleiermacher for an error of inconsistency: Schleiermacher incorrectly applies the principles outlined in the First Part into the Second, and thus ends with an impersonal account of deity and God’s perfective love. Dorner even extends to critiquing Schleiermacher’s account of Christology: for Dorner, there is a profound detachment of the person and work of Christ from the divine will and being in Schleiermacher’s theology, to the extent that the concept of deity in Schleiermacher’s theology proper is moot to any Christological consideration. In his work Divine Immutability: A Critical Reconsideration, Dorner writes, “…the relation of everything to Christ does not require such a universal will. Moreover, if no special divine act, but merely the development of humanity were all that is necessary, then humanity would have redeemed itself.”44 If Schleiermacher were consistent in applying his own principles of divine causality, says Dorner, he would allow for divine self-communication in a way that did not collapse distinctions between “the redeemer and the redeemed.”45 For Dorner, then, the primary assumption of God’s transcendent causality, and his self-revelation in the world, becomes paramount for articulating a Christology that is not merely an elevated anthropology.
The point here is not so much whether or not we agree with Dorner or with his method—indeed, the present author tends to think that Dorner concedes far too much to Schleiermacher, both in content and in message. Nonetheless, Dorner demonstrates the importance of applying a consistent ontological a priori in Christological formulation: constructing Christ from a Christology of God-consciousness on par with redeemed God-consciousness in the human community risks confusing redeemer with redeemed, the next question being, “Whence is Christ?” Instead, Dorner demonstrates that the assumption of an absolute deity in essence and being would naturally lead to perfected personal revelation in humanity, which would demand divine incarnation. Dorner’s Christ is one that is compatible with Chalcedon, although perhaps articulatable as “fully man and fully God,” instead of vice versa. To put it more simply: Dorner slips Christ deity in through the back door of his humanity, and does so using these fundamental ontological considerations.
Let us consider some further lessons that can be gleaned from the function of the ontological a priori in Dorner’s dogmatic. For Dorner’s theology as a whole, the ontological a priori functions as a control: ordered first in his thought, it provides a foundation from which other significant and essential Christian loci can be considered. Because Schleiermacher does not do this, he says much less theologically than what needs to be said. One could argue that Schleiermacher’s anthropology becomes de-divinized as well. Schleiermacher self-consciously jettisoned the image of God language in a way that Dorner did not. Because Dorner fronts an epistemology that bears respect to the sufficiency of God’s sui generis ontology, his dogmatic avoids such theological reduction, and leads him into more soundly orthodox theological waters. To put this in more basic terms: theologians run a strong dogmatic risk by jettisoning the ontological a priori from its primacy. At the risk of over-clarification: this is different from holding to the apologetical value of the ontological argument, which is not what Dorner is doing here. Instead, what is being advocated is a theological and dogmatic value to the ontological a priori, constructed from faith, as in the case of Anselm. There is thus a presuppositionality to the distinction of creator from creation, the transcendent from the immanent, that must be respected on this properly basic level if one is to adequately construct a body of Christian doctrine. In fact, it could be said that this ontological a priori is fronted in Scripture itself, with its bold and presumptive proclamation of “In the beginning, God.” This profound assumption of the Absolute, in Dorner’s terms, utterly distinct and self-sufficient, is the ground from which other doctrines are worked out.
How is this different from simply considering theology proper as dogmatically antecedent to other loci? For Dorner, the concept of God’s sufficient ontology stands as a sort of epistemic foundation that catalyzes posterior theological considerations, not simply as an antecedent locus. In other words, it is properly basic to the task of theology. Recall that Dorner has described this ontological primacy as “the roots of rational thought, with its possibility, that without it that which is one’s own mentality … must cease,” even stating that “We think God through God.”46 As such, there is a concept of self-revelation implanted in and under human ratiocination that Dorner desires to draw out, and in this sense it resonates strongly with Carl F.H. Henry’s “theological transcendent a priori,” a “preformative” view of humanity’s design to both assume God and receive his revelation as being in his image, which Henry drew from Augustine, Luther, and Calvin.47 It is, in a word, the first datum of how the knowledge of God and all things in relation to God is constructed.
To further illustrate by way of conclusion, a return to Webster and McCormack is warranted. Webster’s method respects an ordering toward theology proper: like Dorner, whom he draws from, Webster is willing to front and prioritize a conception of God as God first, and largely desires to retain ontological and economic distinctions based on this assumption. Again, Webster’s larger project was one of articulating a “theological theology” pro se. McCormack does not do this: fundamentally, his project desires to consider Christology itself as a dogmatic antecedent, and the ontological a priori in conceiving the nature and being of God is missing. Not only on the level of dogmatic ordering, but on the level of basic creator/creature distinctions and assumptions, McCormack’s project strives to shoehorn theology proper, and thus the deity of Christ, into a preconceived Christology, which is thus laden with the dualisms Dorner and the later Webster noted and strove to avoid. What McCormack ends up with is a Christ very different from that of Dorner, which he himself admits: where Dorner sees creation and anthropology as designed with “unlimited receptiveness” to the divine self-revelation, McCormack has instead construed Logos as “ontologically receptive,” further clarifying a break down in ontological/economic conceptions by asserting that “…the Bible knows nothing of an independent Logos asarkos (without flesh)”; “…the preexistent Logos as such is a pure postulate, a human invention, alleged to be complete in itself without regard for its activity ad extra. It is an ‘idol’ by any other name.”48 Concordantly, when McCormack proclaims at the end of his volume, “The promise announced by my title has been kept. The integrity of God and human in their uniting in Christ has been preserved,” one gets the impression that he has only resolved a problem of his own devising.49
Conclusion
Dorner’s System of Christian Doctrine, although not without its flaws, is an example of a concentrated dogmatic that carefully orders its knowledge of God toward the assumption of the Absoluteness of God as God. While conceding much to Schleiermacher, Dorner avoids humanistic conceptions of Christ by fronting a robust theology of the divine self-revelation rooted in fundamental assumptions of God’s self-sufficiency and absoluteness, i.e. the ontological a priori. This is how Dorner, while still approaching a Christian dogmatic from the method of correlates of faith, manages to slip Christ’s deity in through the back door of a realized humanity that could only be fully divine, a sort of maneuvered argument for the deity of Christ “from below” that swoops down “from above.” This demonstrates for theologians today that an adequately-defined ontological a priori is dogmatically valuable in avoiding the dualistic pitfalls of Ebionitism or Docetism on the level of Christology, and more importantly avoids the temptation of a reductive or revisionist theology proper and cosmology. Theologians should thus weigh the dogmatic risks before jettisoning the merits of such ontological reasoning, and should consider how, on a basic level, the adoption of such reasoning might lead to holistic biblical and theological conclusions.