In the Absence of Evidence: Mill and James Against Hume’s “Of Miracles” in Conversation with Ancient Voices and Sacred Text

By Adam P. Groza

Introduction

In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume argued against the rationality of belief in miracles on the basis of empiricism. According to Hume, a miracle would constitute a violation of human experience (for example, a violation of the laws of nature). Hume argues that it is never wise (or justified) to believe in miracles on the basis of evidence. In the 237 years since its publication, philosophers and theologians have responded to Hume’s work in a variety of ways. Roy Holland has suggested that Hume’s definition of miracle begs the question.1 Ludwig Wittgenstein offered a phenomenological approach to understanding the reasonableness of miracles, in which divine actions are inferred due to their significance.2 Others, such as Bishop Charles M’llvaine, the late nineteenth century chaplain of the United States Senate and professor of ethics at West Point, claimed that belief in miracles is not based on the veracity of human experience as Hume had suggested, but, rather, upon the omnipotence of God qua God.3

John Stuart Mill, William James, and David Hume

Contrary to these responses to Hume, one finds in both John Stuart Mill and William James unique responses that echo ancient sentiments regarding the rationality of belief in the absence of evidence, or in the absence of what would seem reasonable to someone committed to Humean skepticism.4

In Three Essays on Religion, written between 1850–1870, Mill attempts to construct a utilitarian argument for the reasonableness of faith.5 Given the significance of religion and the intellectual impact of Hume’s Enquiry, Mill addresses Hume directly when he says, “[T]here are thinkers who regard it as a truth of reason that miracles are impossible.”6 Mill objects to Hume for “giving a priori validity to the conclusions of an a posteriori philosophy.”7 While Hume’s skepticism about miracles is rooted in his commitment to empiricism, which leads him to reject miracles on the basis of reason or observation, Mill seeks to show the individual and social utility of religion.8 Mill says: “The essence of religion is the strong and earnest direction of the emotions and desires towards an ideal object, recognized as of the highest excellence, and as rightfully paramount over all selfish objects of desire.”9

Mill is not interested in religion as mere wish fulfillment apart from reason or evidence.10 He does not concede to the demand for faith apart from reason or to the suspension of evidence in regard to religion. Religion is inseparably linked to properly directed belief. The utility of religion is the betterment of mankind, the expansion of happiness and human flourishing.11

Mill is not only favorable to the idea of religion in general, but of religious faith based upon miraculous events. It would be wrong therefore to conclude that Mill is deistic.12 While Mill is skeptical in private correspondence about “spiritualists” who lie about their “pretend experiences,”13 he nevertheless leaves room for the possibility of miracles, saying:

What can be said with truth on the side of miracles amounts only to this: … there is nothing so inherently impossible or absolutely incredible in this supposition [that there is some evidence of the reality of a Creator] as to preclude any one from hoping that it may perhaps be true.14

In the absence of evidence, and given that there is no reason to assume that miracles are impossible (contra Hume), Mill sees that theism in general, and monotheism in particular, are the best grounds for the betterment of society as an expression of “wants of the human mind” that religion supplies.”15 Mill relates religion and poetry to expressions of what would be called imago Dei in biblical anthropology.

Mill calls religious belief the “indulgence to hope.”16 He argues that this is a rational indulgence and proper use of imagination because it brings “power for increasing the happiness of life and giving elevation to the character.”17 In his reflection on religious hope and imagination, he observes that “the principles which ought to govern the cultivation and regulation of the imagination. . . are a subject which has never yet engaged serious consideration of philosophers.”18

The concept of “indulgence to hope” can be illustrated in the writing of Japanese poet Kobayashi Issa (1763–1827):

This world of dew
is a world of dew,
and yet, and yet.19

Issa is commonly interpreted to be reflecting upon the meaninglessness of life given its transiency. The world of dew represents fragility and impermanence. This perspective is a common reflection of Issa’s practice of Jōdo Shinshū Buddhism. Everything is passing, “and yet, and yet.” This final line contains what Mill might call “indulgence to hope.”

Issa’s hope (“and yet, and yet”) is an existential necessity. Nietzsche wrote in Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (i.e. The Gay Science, 1882) that the absence of God is an unbearable weight.20 Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) would later describe this as an existential crisis.21

Mill is postulating religious belief as rational hope; the efficacy of which is not only societal but existential (i.e., character). In his book John Stuart Mill: A Secular Life (2015), Timothy Larsen writes about Mill’s belief in God as a very probable hypothesis.22 Mill was a committed rationalist, but in his posthumously published essay “Theism,” he made the case for belief in God and in Christ. Larsen argues that Mill was not as secular as many would believe, or some would wish. Mill’s religious belief resulted in criticism from his own disciple, John Morley, who wrote in The Fortnightly Review that Mill’s religion and rationalism were “profoundly irreconcilable.”23

In the absence of evidence, Mill concludes that miracles are not only possible but necessary to the metaphysical reality of monotheism and the corresponding human desire for religion, what Mircea Eliade called homo religiosus in his influential book The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion (1957). Eliade argued that man is not only a thinking being (homo sapien) but a religious being (homo religiosus):

Whatever the historical context in which he is placed, homo religiosus always believes that there is an absolute reality, the sacred, which transcends this world but manifests itself in this world, thereby sanctifying it and making it real.24

The evidence which Mill puts forth is both the internal evidence of desire and the corresponding benefits of religion for society. Utility, for Mill, proves the point of theism in a way that is consistent with his commitment to empiricism.

A similar approach is taken by William James, who in 1896 published The Will to Believe. James says that the essence of religion is twofold. First, religion says that the best things are eternal. Second, religion says that we are better off in our temporary lives if we believe in eternal things.25 The kind of belief which James, like Mill, has in mind is consistent with reason and the evidence of utility.

One significant reason why religion has utility is that it gives meaning to life. Starting in section thirty-two of The Will to Believe, James asks the question which Camus will raise in the opening paragraph of The Myth of Sisyphus: Is life worth living? Both men answer in the affirmative, but for very different reasons.26 For Camus, the choice to live in the face of meaninglessness is the essence of life. He finds no inherent hope, as does Issa (“and yet, and yet”). Unlike Camus, James believes that life is worth living because religion helps to awaken the human spirit from pessimism, which he calls “a nightmare view of life.”27

Religion awakes a person from the nightmare of pessimism and from the existential crisis which Camus tried earnestly (though perhaps unsuccessfully) to help his reader avert. To be awake from the nightmare of a life without God is “complete and joyous, and it corresponds to the freer exercise of religious trust and fancy.”28 Waiting for evidence in order to believe, what James calls “agnostic positivism,” is unreasonable because “neutrality is not only inwardly difficult, it is also outwardly unrealizable, where our relations to an alternative are practical and vital.”29

James therefore advocates for reasonable belief in the absence of evidence when the following conditions are met. First, when there is not enough evidence to settle the matter. Second, when a person must choose. Third, when both choices are “live options” and not merely theoretical (as in the case of agnostic positivism). Fourth, when one’s choice will have significant consequences. In such cases, belief is reasonable.

Both Mill and James connect the benefits of aspirational belief in regard to religion to morality and the societal benefits of morality grounded in theism. James identifies two tendencies of humanity, one called the “easy-going mood” and the other the “strenuous mood.” When in an easy-going mood, a person shrinks back from hardship in order to experience immediate pleasure. By contrast, the strenuous mood enables a person to embrace hardship or discomfort in order to obtain a greater good. Religion, according to James, moves a person from an easy-going mood to a strenuous mood. Since according to James this is the “deepest difference, practically” to religion, a society lacking religious motivation for virtue will cultivate an easy-going population, morally speaking; a dilemma C.S. Lewis identified as “men without chests” in The Abolition of Man. For these reasons, James advocates belief in God and in miracles apart from evidence.30

Mill’s concept of the “indulgence of hope” and James’ Will to Believe have drawn parallels to Pascal’s Wager. James mercilessly anticipates the comparison and dismisses the wager as “a last desperate snatch at a weapon against the hardness of the unbelieving heart,” saying “when religious faith expresses itself thus (i.e., in the language of games) it is put to its last trumps.”31 But James misunderstands the Wager, the force of which is intended for a homogenous religious context where the question at hand is whether or not to believe in a particular God. It is not intended to be a means to adjudicate which God one will choose to believe.32

These differences aside, it seems that there is a great deal in common between Mill, James, and Pascal in regard to the relationship between faith and evidence. All three are concerned with the practical application of faith for social good. All three see evidence and reason alone as being insufficient to settle the matter of religious belief. All three disagree with skepticism in regard to the reasonableness of faith where miracles are involved. All three understand that hope, volition, and choice play a defining role in religious experience.

Hope and Epistemology

The language of hope, volition, and choice can be understood as appealing to epistemic posture. Where evidence is intended to force a person’s hand in regard to religious faith, argument, appealing to epistemic posture only intends to incline a person towards religious faith. If evidence does not settle the matter of religious faith, then a person must choose; in doing so, why would a person choose a universe in which there is no God? Certainly Mill, James, and Pascal see the clear implications, as do Nietzsche and Camus, albeit in reaching different conclusions.

Pragmatic arguments for the reasonableness of religious belief in the absence of evidence have ancient precedence. One finds in both Plato (Laws) and Aristotle (Physics) inferences from concrete particulars to abstract (and eternal) realities. In both cases, these realities are closely linked to the coherence of the system (i.e., that it works) and to the moral implications (i.e., the common good). Augustine, as well, presents faith as rational, practical, and preceding knowledge.33 In City of God, he argues for truth both by thesis and antithesis.34 The Epicurean arguments for a person to consult their happiness, in relation to actions, are similarly pragmatic although the nature of their belief system is perhaps not religious in a traditional sense.

Pragmatic arguments exist in Western, Eastern, and Native American religious traditions. Philosopher Scott L. Pratt writes in his book Native Pragmatism: Rethinking the Roots of American Philosophy (2002) that while pragmatism is generally regarded to be an American approach to philosophy independent from European confines of tradition, it can be found before the nineteenth century in Native American religion and philosophy.35 In Native tradition, pragmatic argumentation is evident in regard to the concept of place. Existing in a certain place, for Native Americans, corresponded to well-being and often was rooted in creation myths. Creation myth led to concepts of sacredness of land and wellbeing. Together, these became the foundation of all other religious sentiments.36

Early Christian writers such as Athenagoras of Athens made arguments for the goodness, truth, and beauty of Christianity. While modern apologetics focuses on truth (i.e. validity), premodern apologists appealed to goodness and beauty as well as truth. In his book Embassy for the Christian, Athenagoras argues that societal outcomes are better given the Christian faith than in polytheistic alternatives.

These arguments do not agree on the substance of belief but on the form of appeal. Pascal, for instance, is not generous in his comments about Islam (as a religion), but his kind of pragmatic argument for belief has a rich tradition within Islam. M. Shahid Alam has argued that The Qur’an includes a version of the Wager which, similar to that of Pascal, “satisfies all the conditions set out by William James for such a wager to have force.”37 The arguments in the Qur’an (as with Pascal, Mill, and James) are pragmatic because they make utility (in the absence of evidence) “the criterion for forming beliefs.”38 One such Qur’anic Wager identified by Alam is in Surah 41 (Fussilat), in which pagans, such as Ȃd and Thamûd (41:13) are seen as paying the price of their unbelief.

In response to the skeptics, he poses the following question: “Imagine if this Qur’an is truly from Allah and you deny it?”39

Implicit in this question is the same wager that is set up by Pascal: Either the Qur’an is from God, or it is not. If the Qur’an is from God, there is afterlife, there is an eternity in Hell for disbelievers, etc. The converse holds if the Qur’an is not from God. These are your only options: and you have to choose one or the other. You have chosen to reject the Qur’an, together with its belief in an afterlife. You are cocky about your choice: you think that afterlife is a lie and, therefore, you have nothing to fear from death.40

The Bible also utilizes pragmatic arguments that appeal to self-interest, consequences, and social implications of belief. The biblical character Gamaliel, for instance, argues before the Sanhedrin that if the Christian movement is from God, no one will be able to stop it, and if it is not from God, then it will come to nothing. In effect, he is saying “We don’t know” and in the absence of evidence, effectively asking, “Are you sure you want to risk opposing God?”41

Of course, both the Bible and Qua’ran appeal to evidence for belief in God; notably by appealing to creation and omnipotence.42 This suggests, as Jeff Jordan has observed, that the kind of pragmatic argument one can trace from these ancient sources through Pascal to Mill and James are not opposed to evidence in regard to faith. It is not the case that evidence plays no part in faith, but rather that evidence does not settle the matter apart from belief.43

Moreover, both the Bible and Qur’an teach that people will be without excuse when they stand before God. Sūrat al-‘Arāf 7:172 says:

[Prophet], when your Lord took out the offspring from the loins of the Children of Adam and made them bear witness about themselves, He said, “Am I not your Lord?” and they replied, “Yes, we bear witness.” So you cannot say on the Day of Resurrection, “We were not aware of this.”

Similarly, the Apostle Paul says in Romans 1:20 that unbelievers are without excuse (ἀναπολογήτους).44 Elsewhere the Psalmist says, “The fool has said in his heart there is no God.”45 Similarly in al-Baqarah, unbelievers are fools but do not know that they are fools.46 Both the Bible and the Qur’an situate pragmatic arguments for belief in the context of what should be overwhelming evidence, the impact of which is affected by sin.47 There is evidence, but unbelievers are unable or unwilling to see the evidence properly.48

This gap between unbelief, evidence, and volition is handled differently by theologians and philosophers and can be, among the everyday faithful, a source of great controversy. In terms of those discussed in this paper, Pascal advises that those who want to believe but are unable to essentially “fake it till you make it”: act faithfully in the hopes that God would reveal himself and impart saving faith. In essence, do the things that believers do in the hope that in so doing you will become a believer. For Mill, belief in God as “a probable hypothesis” is an act of hope for the sake of what the proposition of theism means, by inference, for explaining the universe in accordance with the principle of utility.49

James saw the idea of materialist determinism, with no room for God, the soul, etc. to be the great failing of his generation:

And this systematic denial on science’s part of personality as a condition of events, this rigorous belief that in its own essential and innermost nature our world is a strictly impersonal world, may, conceivably, as the whirligig of time goes round, prove to be the very defect that our descendants will be most surprised at in our own boasted science, the omission that to their eyes will most tend to make it look perspectiveless (sic) and short.50

As a result, James emphasizes the humanity of volition and of choice in a way that (perhaps surprisingly) echoes Nietzsche and Camus. Religion, for James, is not an enemy of the will, but that which invites a person to activate their will and choose to believe in a universe with a greater good: And yet, and yet.

Ironically, while it would appear that Hume’s metaphysical skepticism and empiricism would naturally lead to atheism or agnosticism, he was likely a believer. The traditional claim that Hume was an atheist or agnostic is a conclusion made by such accomplished philosophers as Anthony Flew, John Price, and A. J. Ayer. This conclusion appears to be the majority position in what Timothy Yoder calls “the conventional story” in his 2005 doctoral which seeks to challenge this interpretation of Hume.51

However, it may likely be the case that Hume engaged in strategic ambiguity in regard to his own beliefs.52 Yoder has presented compelling arguments to the effect that Hume believed in “genuine theism” and “true religion,” the substance of which is outside the purview of this paper. What is clear is that Hume critiqued the negative social impact of superstitious religion and, for someone who apparently didn’t believe in religion, was seemingly unable to stop writing about it.53

Yoder argues that Hume’s intention is not only to critique the shortcomings of religion, but also to identify what was right and true in religion.54 Hume is clearly a religious nonconformist, but passages in the essay “Of Superstitions and Enthusiasm” and in the Natural History of Religion and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion reveal Hume to be a theist.55

Hume’s theism appears to be based, in part, on the fact that belief in God is innate, universal, certain, and self-evident.56 Yoder observes that for Hume, the proper perspective on God “is a fideistic one, in which the otherness of God is emphasized, and the likeness of God to human beings is severely minimized.”57

Hume does not seem to be very far from Pascal, who is routinely identified as a fideistic philosopher.58 However, Pascal’s most profound religious epiphany was in a turn from the God of the philosophers (reason) to the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (revelation). Hume’s project is to emphasize the importance of philosophy to genuine religion, quoting Francis Bacon: “A little philosophy makes men atheists: A great deal reconciles them to religion.”59 Hume wanted to encourage skepticism against the human tendency towards excessive firmness of conviction and in so doing to point the reader to common sense experience. He says that “almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and to the belief, which attends experience.”60

Conclusion

Pragmatic argumentation for God’s existence and for belief attempts to bypass abstract reasoning and argumentation by appealing to the practical implications of faith for both the individual and society. Such arguments take different forms and have a rich history in philosophy, the Bible, and the Qur’an. In rejecting miracles on the basis of empiricism, Hume is attempting to encourage a philosophical revival of belief (i.e., genuine religion) not based in superstition but in experience, which is where, as we have seen, pragmatic arguments tend to draw their greatest force.

Pragmatic arguments need not imply subjectivism. Arguing from subjective experience does not imply that reality, or truth, are subjective. William James, in section 6 of The Will to Believe, does not doubt that objective reality exists (in regard to religious truth) but only that humans can access such truth by reason and intellect. In place of evidential arguments, pragmatic arguments appeal to experience, benefits, and outcomes. Because these things can be verified through observation, both the Christian and Islamic task of persuasion is compatible with such pragmatic argumentation.61

Hume’s arguments against miracles and the responses from Mill and James find psychological, pragmatic, and utilitarian reasons to justify the rationality of religious belief. The responses of Mill and James have an ancient and diverse precedent as well as a contemporary appeal. Here is one place where Islamic and Christian philosophers can come together and unite in opposing arguments against the supernatural. Both Islamic and Christian theistic (as opposed to deistic) worldviews promote a God who actively and consistently intervenes in the world. This intervention, an intervention into a world that Christians and Muslims believe God created to be worked within the cause-and-effect system, is defined as a “miracle.” While it admittedly takes faith to believe in miracles, it is in miracles that both the Islamic and Christian faiths make their exclusivist claims.